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Intra-Household Work Timing: 
The Effect on Joint Activities and the Demand for Child Care 
 
This study examines if couples time their work hours and how this work timing influences 
child care demand and the time that spouses jointly spend on leisure, household chores and 
child care. By using a innovative matching strategy, this studies identifies the timing of work 
hours that cannot be explained by factors other than the partners’ potential to communicate 
on the timing of their work. The main findings are that couples with children create less 
overlap in their work times and this effect is more pronounced the younger the children. We 
find evidence for a togetherness preference of spouses, but only for childless couples. Work 
timing also influences the joint time that is spent on household chores, but the effect is small. 
Finally, work timing behavior affects the demand for informal child care, but not the demand 
for formal child care. 
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 1 Introduction
Over the past 40 years there has been an enormous increase in female labor force participation in Europe, and
this has resulted in more dual-earner households over time. For the Netherlands, for example, the labor force
participation rate for women as a percentage of the population of women aged between 15 and 64 increased
from 26 percent in 1960 to 71 percent in 2007. A similar increase could also be observed in other European
countries.1 As a consequence, work timing between spouses is of more importance now than in the past. The
argument for this is straightforward: the presence of two job schedules makes coordination of family time
more diﬃcult than in a traditional one-breadwinner household. Therefore, spouses of contemporary couples
in Europe face two potentially conﬂicting work schedules when ﬁguring out how to allocate their time over
a week.
Economic models of labor supply generally distinguish between two eﬀects that labor supply may have on
a person’s utility: a negative eﬀect as the working eﬀort reduces utility, and a positive eﬀect since paid work
generates income that enables consumption. Studies that examine these eﬀects for dual-earner households
usually focus on how spouses choose the optimal amount of labor, while the timing of these labor hours is
often not taken into account.
The sociological literature recognizes the issue of work timing and coordination aspects, but only recently
(see Sullivan (1996), Lesnard (2004)). This aspect is generally framed within the work-life balance problem
and the transformation engendered by greater ﬂexibility of the economy, on the one hand, and the changing
role of women in the family and society, on the other (Moen (2003), Crompton (2006)). Also it is mentioned
that work schedules overlap less now than in the past because of the growing service economy (sometimes
referred to as the ”24/7 economy”, Presser (1999, 2003)). Poor alignment of work schedules within households
is usually viewed as something negative as the reduced time that can be spent together may threat family
solidarity (Strazdins, Korda, Lynette, Broom and DSouza (2004)). However, some potential beneﬁts are
also postulated and have been empirically tested. For example, having more control over working times
may allow dual-earner couples to arrive at a more equal division of housework (Presser 1994) and child care
responsibilities (Lesnard (2005)). In this sense, having non-overlapping schedules may constitute a resource
and an alternative to child care services for working parents, rather than a harmful feature of contemporary
family life.
In this study we examine how the spouses of Dutch dual-earner households time their work hours. This is
an intriguing question because, ﬁrst of all, heterogeneity between spouses and between households in working
schedule arrangements and restrictions in choosing the optimal work schedule are normally not part of the
traditional time allocation model. As a result, neglecting the work timing behavior of the spouses may cause
biased estimates of the (economic) incentives for labor supply and when it is performed (Hallberg (2003)).
Secondly, parents who have more control over their work times may have diﬀerent child care demands. The
latter is important for policy that is related to child care subsidy and female labor force participation.
In this study work timing is considered as an act that leads to hours of paid work performed by both
spouses at a time, the joint nature of which cannot be explained by factors other than the partners’ potential
to communicate on the timing of their paid work. The timing of work hours is measured by the hours that
spouses simultaneously work per week. We refer to this as the ‘overlap in paid working hours’, or ,in short,
work time overlap (WTO).
Diﬀerent behavioral arguments can underlie the observed WTO of spouses, and we illustrate this by
using the notion that dual-earner households have in fact one joint work schedule. According to this work
schedule, we can distinguish three situations: (1) both spouses are at work; (2) one of the two spouses is
at work; and (3) none of the spouses are at work. From a togetherness perspective, spouses may decide to
maximize the hours that they are both at work at the same time as this maximizes the potential for joint
leisure time. Parents, on the other hand, may want to minimize the cost of paid child care or may prefer
parental care to non-parental care. These parents maximize the hours that one of the parents is at work
(i.e. situation 2) as this maximizes the potential time that one of the parents can care for their child. Along
1Statistics on the increase in female labor participation can be found in, among others, OECD Employment Outlook (2007)
and Kaiser (2006). We note that the Netherlands is a speciﬁc case because people are relatively more in control over the timing
of their work schedules due to the existence of part-time jobs.
2similar lines we can reason that spouses may want to maximize the potential for joint housework time and
joint child care time.
It is diﬃcult to disentangle which part of the observed WTO is caused by the (non-observed) timing
behavior of the spouses, and which part is caused by the fact that persons with certain characteristics end
up in certain jobs with associated working times. The ideal setting for measuring work timing is one where
we examine the WTO of two random samples, say sample I and II. The spouses in both samples are, on
average, identical in their characteristics, with this diﬀerence: that the spouses in sample I cannot time their
working hours, while the spouses in sample II can time their working hours. An estimate that measures the
average amount of work timing is obtained by comparing the average WTO between the two samples. Given
this setting, it would be possible to examine how the work timing measure varies for diﬀerent household
types.
In practice, we observe spouses who possibly time their work hours but we do not observe a control group
where the possibility of work timing is ruled out. The nature of this problem relates to the potential outcome
model (see (Splawa)-Neyman, J. (1923, 1990), Roy (1951), Rubin (1974), Rubin (1976) and Holland (1986)).
According to this model, we observe two potential outcomes for each household. The ﬁrst outcome relates
to the situation where spouses can time their paid working hours, and the second outcome relates to the
situation where spouses cannot time their working hours. However, we can never observe both outcomes at
the same time.2
Studies by Hamermesh (1996, 2000), Hallberg (2003), Jenkins and Osberg (2005), recognize this problem.3
In both studies a control group is simulated where the possibility of work timing is ruled out. This control
group consists of matched singles with characteristics similar to that of the spouses. The underlying thought
is that, although the matched singles have similar characteristics than the spouses, they cannot interact, so
that no timing behavior can take place. When Hallberg (2003) and Jenkins and Osberg (2005) compare the
WTO of the spouses with that of the control group, a small but signiﬁcant diﬀerence is found. This means
that there is empirical evidence for work timing but that the eﬀect that is found is small.
The drawbacks of using a singles sample for the construction of a control group are that: (1) singles are
diﬀerently constrained and may have diﬀerent preferences than non-singles. When comparing working time
hours, it seems diﬃcult to justify that singles with children are comparable to non-singles with children; and
(2) there may be selection into marriage so that the probability of two persons becoming a couple increases
when there is more WTO. In this case observing more WTO can be the result of marriage as such, rather
than work timing. Because of these drawbacks, the work timing estimates of Hallberg (2003) and Jenkins
and Osberg (2005) may be biased and consequently it is not clear whether their ﬁndings can be ascribed to
work timing or if there are other factors involved.
The ﬁrst contribution of this study is that we propose an alternative simulation method to distinguish
between the work timing behavior of the spouses and the overlap in work times caused by the fact that
persons with certain characteristics end up in certain jobs. Because we do not use information on singles
we overcome the above-mentioned problems. We simulate how the amount of WTO would vary if spouses
did not have the possibility to time their work hours and identify the amount of WTO that is the result
of work timing. In this simulation we match couples to other identical couples in the sample and then the
couples that are matched switch partners. The average WTO of the couples that remain after the partner
switch can be regarded as the control situation where spouses have similar characteristic but cannot time
their work hours. Comparing this control outcome with the observed WTO of the spouses provides us with
a work timing estimate.4
The second contribution of this study is that we examine how the work timing estimate relates to the
demand for child care and relates to the time that spouses spend jointly on other activities, such as, leisure,
housework and, if applicable, child care.
The relation between the timing of work and the demand for child care is interesting as it may shed some
light on how spouses decide on their labor supply, taking into account the timing possibilities they have and
2The outcome that is not observed is usually referred to as the counterfactual outcome.
3Other interesting studies that discuss the timing of work hours are Sullivan (1996) and Van Velzen (2001).
4In Van Klaveren and Maassen van den Brink (2007), we found a small work timing eﬀect using this methodology.
3the current state of child care services and costs. Although the relation between labor supply and child care
is discussed in many studies (see, among others, Becker and Lewis (1973), Maassen van den Brink (1994),
Hamermesh (2000), Hallberg and Klevmarken (2003), Del-Boca and Vuri (2005)), the focus of these studies
is mainly on the quantity of labor supply instead of the timing behavior. We may ﬁnd, for example, that
parents who create less WTO also demand less child care, which may reﬂect that parents avoid expensive
child care costs by the timing of their work schedules or that parents have a preference for parental child
care. Finding a correlation between the work timing estimate and the demand for child care is interesting
from a policy perspective: more ﬂexible working times could become one of the ingredients of a policy mix
such that the focus is more on the work-family balance. Finding this balance is now often diﬃcult for spouses
in dual-earner households because labor market rigidities restrict them in the timing of their working hours
(Carriero, Ghysels and Van Klaveren (2009)).
The work timing behavior of spouses may relate to the time that spouses spend jointly on leisure,
housework, and child care. The intuition is that when spouses create more WTO, they create potentially
more time to perform other activities together. In van Velzen (2001), Hallberg (2003), Jenkins and Osberg
(2005) and Van Klaveren and Maassen van den Brink (2007), there is empirical evidence that spouses have
a preference for togetherness. Timing behavior may also relate to the time that spouses jointly spend on
housework and child care and these relations have been little investigated in labor economics and sociology.
The structure of this paper is a follows. In Section 2, the data are described. In Section 3, we illustrate
the procedure that is used to simulate the control group and discuss the simulation results. In Section 4, we
examine how work timing relates to the demand for child care and the time that spouses jointly spend on
leisure, housework and child care. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and Descriptive Results
For this study we had the opportunity to ask several questions in the Post Initial Schooling Survey. The data
set was collected in December 2005 by the Dutch Institute for Public Opinion and Market Research (TNS
NIPO) and is a cross-section of the Dutch population aged from 16 to 64. We use data on 1830 two-earner
households. For both spouses there is information available on when they work during the week, but it is
possible that one of the spouses answered on behalf of the partner.
Various questions were asked in order to obtain accurate work timing information. Control questions
were included, in order to minimize the eﬀort required from parents to ﬁll in their work schedules. For
example, parents were asked (1) on which day of the week they usually work; and (2) whether they work
during the same hours each day. If a spouse answered the second question aﬃrmatively, then he or she had
to ﬁll in the working times for only one of the days he or she works. On the other hand, if a spouse did
not answer the second question aﬃrmatively, then he or she had to ﬁll in the working times for each day of
the week they usually work. This information suﬃces to determine when and how many hours both spouses
work.
In Figure 1 we show during which hours the men and the women in our sample work. The horizontal
axis represents the 24 hours of the day and the vertical axis represents the percentage of men and women
who work during these hours. Men are represented by a straight line, while women are represented by a
dotted line.
Although most men work between 8 am and 5 pm, the labor activity of men starts around 6 am and
ﬁnishes approximately around 7 pm. Most women work between 10 am and 5 pm and we observe a peak
between 10 am and 12 noon. The labor activity of women starts somewhat later than men (around 7 am)
and ends somewhat earlier than men (around 6 pm). As was to be expected, spouses usually do not work
on a Saturday or a Sunday. These graphs conﬁrm the patterns that are generally found for the Netherlands
(see Breedveld, van den Broek, de Haan, Harms, Huysmans and van Ingen (2006) and the time use study
of 2005 performed by the Social and Cultural Planning Oﬃce of the Netherlands (in Dutch : het SCP
Tijdsbestedingsonderzoek, 2005)).5
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Figure 1: When do men and women work during the day?
representative data for the Netherlands on work times for men and women.
5Information regarding the working days and the working hours of spouses is shown in Table 1. Men
usually work 4 or 5 days per week and about 83 percent of them work 5 days per week or more. Women
are part-time workers since about 65 percent of the females work 4 days per week or less. On average, men
work more labor hours (44.2 hours per week) compared with women (27.14 hours) as is generally found for
the Netherlands.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics Working Days & Working Hours
Men Women
Freq. % Freq. %
# working days
1 12 0.66 48 2.62
2 11 0.60 231 12.62
3 42 2.30 512 27.98
4 247 13.50 425 23.22
5 1,323 72.30 530 28.96
6 134 7.32 39 2.13
7 61 3.33 45 2.46
Total 1830 100 1830 100
Average labor hours 44.21 27.14
St. Dev. of labor hours 11.44 13.44
To ﬁnd out if spouses are able to time their work schedules, we asked them if they can inﬂuence the time
they start or end working. The descriptive statistics of their answers are printed in Table 2. 38 percent
of the men and 43 percent of the women report that it is not possible or diﬃcult, to inﬂuence their work
timing substantially. For these persons we cannot distinguish between spouses for whom work timing is very
diﬃcult or for whom work timing is not even possible. On the other hand, 62 percent of the men and 57
percent of the women answer that they can time their work hours to a considerable extent. This means that
these persons have the opportunity to time their work hours according to their preferences.
Table 2: Flexibility in Work Times
Freq. %
Men
Not at all/very diﬃcult 690 37.70
Within boundaries but I have to report it in advance 397 21.69
Within boundaries but I don’t have to report it in advance 386 21.09
I can determine (almost) fully when I work during the day 357 19.51
Total 1830 100
Women
Not at all/very diﬃcult 791 43.22
Within boundaries but I have to report it in advance 512 27.98
Within boundaries but I don’t have to report it in advance 279 15.25
I can determine (almost) fully when I work during the day 248 13.55
Total 1830 100
6In Table 3 we show the respondents’ answers on whether they found their current job before or after they
started living together. This question was asked because persons have the opportunity to switch to jobs with
more favorable work times, and this can be considered as work timing as well. If the spouses answered that
they found their current job before they started living together, then more favorable work times have not
been realized by means of a job switch. It is possible that these persons were able to realize more favorable
working times at their current employer, and this may even be one of the reasons why they are still in their
current job. However, on average, we would expect that in the latter case work time adjustments are more
diﬃcult as an agreement has to be reached with the employer. In our sample, approximately 42 percent of
the men and 31 percent of the women were in their current jobs before they started living together, and
so these persons did not time their work schedules by switching jobs. The work timing is therefore solely
dependent on the extent to which they can inﬂuence the daily starting/ending times of their job.
Table 3: Current job was obtained before living together
Men Women
Freq. % Freq. %
True 759 41.48 559 30.55
Not true 895 48.91 1095 59.84
Non-response 176 9.62 176 9.62
Total 1830 100 1830 100
Work timing is measured by the amount of paid labor hours hours that the spouses simultaneously work
per week. In table 4, we show the OLS estimation results, where we have regressed the WTO of spouses
on variables that are thought to have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on this WTO.6 In order to have an idea of the
magnitude of the eﬀects, we report the average amount of WTO.
We emphasize that the obtained estimates give an impression of how the amount of WTO varies over
the diﬀerent household types in the sample. They do not necessarily reﬂect how spouses time their work
schedules because the signiﬁcance of certain characteristics may also arise from the fact that there is selection
into job types. For example, higher educated persons are more likely to self-select a full-time job, and as
a consequence we ﬁnd that the level of education is positively related to WTO. However, in this case the
observed relation can not be ascribed to the timing of work schedules.
6For presentational convenience, we do not show the estimates of 12 dummies that indicate on which days the spouses work.
The full estimation results are available on request.
7Table 4: Work Time Overlap Regression
Estimate t-statistic
Household Characteristics
# Children between 0-4 -1.844∗∗∗ -4.69
# Children between 4-12 -1.709∗∗∗ -7.11
# Children between 12 plus -0.425∗ -1.65
Spouses met each other at work (N=219)‡ 1.019 1.61
Spouses met at a club (N=173)‡ -0.014 -0.02
Spouses met each other through friends (N=317)‡ 0.898 1.61
Spouses met each other by the internet (N=102)‡ -0.303 -0.34
Spouses met each other somewhere else (N=446)‡ 0.572 1.13
Men’s Characteristics
Weekly work hours 0.177∗∗∗ 8.86
Timing of current job and living together† 0.304 0.76
Education level 0.291∗∗ 2.23
Flexible work times 0.908∗∗∗ 5.27
Women’s Characteristics
Weekly work hours 0.603∗∗∗ 32.70
Timing of current job and living together† 0.320 0.75
Education level 0.539∗∗∗ 3.87
Flexible work times 0.400∗∗ 2.23
Control† 2.326∗∗ 2.31
Constant -25.412∗∗∗ -15.79




Note:  signiﬁcant at the 10% level,  signiﬁcant at the 5% level,  signiﬁcant at the 1% level. ythe
relation between the start of the current job and the moment spouses started living together contains 179
missing values that are replaced to -1. To control for these missing values, we included a dummy variable,
control, that is 1 for each -1-value and zero otherwise. zThe reference group are partners who have met each
other at places of entertainment (N=573).
The amount of WTO is lower when spouses have children and this eﬀect is stronger the younger the
children. Although parents may prefer to maximize the time that they themselves can take care of their
children, it may also reﬂect the fact that women usually choose to work less hours when children are born.
The latter reﬂects work timing by the job-hour choice, and this is not the eﬀect we are interested in. The
observation that WTO is lower when spouses have children is also found by Hamermesh (2000), Hallberg
(2003), van Velzen (2001) and Van Klaveren and Maassen van den Brink (2007).
There may be selection into marriage, and therefore the probability of two persons becoming a couple
increases when there is more WTO. As a consequence the ‘realization’ of a couple is caused by the fact that
there is more overlap in work times in the ﬁrst place. We addressed this selection problem by including, ﬁrst
of all, dummies that indicate where partners have met each other and, secondly, dummies that indicate if
the (fe)males worked in their current job before the partnership formation took place. The idea of including
the ﬁrst set of indicators was that partners are more likely to meet each other when there is more overlap
in work times to begin with. For example, the probability of meeting each other at work increases when
8work schedules overlap more. However, the meeting dummies are all insigniﬁcant. The second indicator
is included, because persons who already had their current job before the partnership formation did not
change their working times due the job choice. Suppose, for example, that the male meets his partner and
that both he and his partner agree that the current work times are not optimal and a burden for a good-
quality relationship. Then the easiest way to address this problem is that he will look for another job with
more convenient working times. Hence, observing a switch after the moment of partnership formation could
indicate work timing by changing jobs. The empirical results, however, do not support this view.
Obviously the amount of WTO is signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the working hours of both spouses. The
maximum amount of WTO is determined by the spouse who works the smallest amount of labor hours, and
at the same time the probability of observing more WTO increases if the working hours of the spouse who
works the most increases.
The education variables represent the highest attained education level of the spouses, and this level is
measured on a scale from 1 to 7. The lowest education level represents primary education and the highest
education level represents having a university degree. When spouses are higher educated they tend to have
more WTO.
3 Matching Procedure and Estimation Results
3.1 Matching Procedure
To obtain an estimate of work timing, it would be desirable to compare the WTO of the couples in our
sample with the WTO of a control group of couples. Both the spouses and the control group should have
similar characteristics, but while the spouses in our sample have the possibility to interact, this interaction
should be ruled out for the control group.
In Van Klaveren and Maassen van den Brink (2007), this control group was simulated by using an exact
matching strategy that matches households to other households. The problem of this strategy is that the
probability of ﬁnding an exact match decreases with the number of matching characteristics. Moreover, it is
not possible to use continuous variables as matching variables as the probability of ﬁnding an exact match
drops dramatically. As a result, it is less likely that a match can be found for households with unusual
characteristics and the estimate that is obtained is then more similar to a regression-towards-the-mean-
estimate. We therefore use a diﬀerent matching technique than in our former research.
We start by matching each household in the sample to the best look-alike household in the sample, and
this matching strategy is usually referred to as Nearest Neighbor Matching. In order to do so we use a distance
measure, that is referred to as the Mahalanobis distance, that measures the distance from one household to
another household on the basis of certain matching characteristics (X) that are thought to inﬂuence WTO.
We impose a matching rule that minimizes this distance between households. More formally, household i
can be matched to another household j, in a sample with N households, according to the following rule:
M(i;j) = 1 if j = arg min
j=1;:::;N i(Xi   Xj)′Σ−1(Xi   Xj);
where M = 1 if a match is possible, and where N−i stands for the sample N with the exception of couple i.
It can happen that household i is matched to more than one household and in this case we randomly pick
a household from the group of potential matches. An advantage of the Mahalanobis distance is that it is
non-parametric and consequently does not rely on any functional form or distribution.
The WTO of the control group is obtained as follows. Couples are matched with other identical couples
in the sample based on the Mahalanobis distance measure and then the couples that are matched switch
partners. The average WTO of the couples that remain after the partner switch is regarded as the control
outcome. We will refer to this outcome as WTOc.
Let us deﬁne an indicator variable, I, that equals 1 if spouses can interact, and 0 otherwise. The WTO
when the spouses do not interact is approximated by the WTO of the control group, WTOc, such that we
9have:
∆ = E(WTOjX;I = 1)   E(WTOcjXc;I = 0): (1)
By construction, the couples with switched partners with characteristics Xc cannot actively synchronize
their work schedules, such that I= 0. The work timing estimate is represented in Equation (1) by ∆, under
the assumption that diﬀerences in WTO cannot be attributed to the diﬀerences in individual and household
characteristics between the couples and the matched couples.
3.2 Matching Results
The signiﬁcant variables in the WTO regression (Table 4) are used as matching variables. In Table 5, we
show the descriptive statistics of the matching variables for the couples and the matched control couples
selected by the Nearest Neighbor Matching method. The p-values in the last column indicate if the diﬀerences
between the couples and the matched couples are signiﬁcant.7
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for couples and matched couples
Couples Matched Couples
Mean1 Std.Dev. Mean2 Std.Dev. Diﬀerence (p-value)
Household Characteristics
# Children between 0-4 0.23 0.52 0.23 0.53 0.824
# Children between 4-12 0.51 0.83 0.50 0.82 0.737
# Children between 12 plus 0.41 0.79 0.38 0.76 0.208
work time overlap 20.60 13.91 20.90 14.22 0.956
Men’s Characteristics
Weekly work hours 48.84 12.52 49.32 12.58 0.245
Education level 3.04 1.64 3.03 1.64 0.883
Flexible work times 2.22 1.15 2.22 1.16 0.900
Women’s Characteristics
Weekly work hours 29.56 14.58 29.77 14.52 0.660
Education level 3.16 1.54 3.12 1.52 0433
Flexible work times 1.99 1.06 1.92 1.04 0.121
N 915 915
Note:  signiﬁcant at the 10% level,  signiﬁcant at the 5% level,  signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Table 5 shows that the match was successful. First of all, the matching variables do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly
between the couples and the matched couples.8This may seem trivial, since the variables presented in Table
5 are the conditioning variables in the matching procedure. However, the matching procedure matches
household on the basis of the entire set of conditioning variables, but this does not ensure that households
are similar with respect to each individual conditioning variable. Secondly, the matching model does not
ensure that couples and matched couples have the same work time overlap. If we condition on all ‘relevant’
characteristics that capture both selection into work schedules and active synchronization of work schedules,
7Again, we do not mention the 14 work day dummies as they are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent, and presenting them in Table 5
would make the the table more diﬃcult to read.
8
10then we should ﬁnd that work timing is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between couples and matched couples.
However, if we would ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in work time overlap after the matching procedure, this
would raise the question whether the appropriate conditioning variables were included in the matching. The
ﬁnding that couples and matched couples have the same work time overlap therefore provides empirical
support for the hypothesis that we used the appropriate conditioning variables.
Do couples time their work schedules?
To examine whether couples time their work schedules we perform separate regressions for couples and control
couples and estimate how work time overlap varies with a set of dummies that characterizes the household.
The following household characteristics are distinguished: the presence of children by age category, the
education level of both spouses, the (gross) level of household income, and whether spouses have control over
their own working times.
Table 6 shows the predicted hours of work time overlap by the distinguished household characteristics.
The ﬁfth column shows whether the predicted hours of work time overlap diﬀers between couples and control
couples. This diﬀerence represents the work timing estimate, ∆, as in equation (2).
Spouses without children create 2.25 hours more WTO, and these hours can potentially be used to spend
more time on another joint activity, such as leisure. Parents, on the other hand, create less WTO. Parents
with a child aged between 0 and 4, create 2.75 hours less WTO. Parents with a child aged between 5 and
12 or aged 12 years and older create, respectively, 2.42 and 1.26 hours less WTO. This is in line with the
intuition that parents minimize the cost of child care by minimizing the amount of WTO or that they prefer
parental care over non-parental care. In Section 4.2 we return to this issue in more detail.
11Table 6: Comparison WTO Couples and Control Couples
WTO WTOc ∆
Household
No child 24.96 22.71 2.25∗∗∗
Child present aged 0-4 15.32 18.07 -2.75∗∗∗
Child present aged 4-12 15.92 18.34 -2.42∗∗∗
Child present aged 12 plus 17.94 19.20 -1.26∗∗∗
Gross Household income low 18.98 19.67 -0.70∗∗∗
med. 20.22 20.47 -0.25∗∗∗
high 23.44 21.92 1.51∗∗∗
Men
Education level low 21.14 20.71 0.43
med. 20.42 20.45 -0.03
high 20.43 20.72 -0.28
Flexible work times very low 18.84 19.46 -0.63∗∗∗
low 19.69 20.37 -0.67∗∗∗
high 21.96 20.54 1.42∗∗∗
very high 23.56 23.07 0.50∗∗∗
Women
Education level low 17.62 18.56 -0.93∗∗∗
med. 20.01 20.28 -0.28∗∗∗
high 23.90 22.64 1.26∗∗∗
Flexible work times very low 19.20 20.17 -0.97∗∗∗
low 20.76 20.46 0.30∗∗∗
high 23.67 21.58 2.09∗∗∗
very high 21.30 21.07 0.23∗∗∗
Note:  signiﬁcant at the 10% level,  signiﬁcant at the 5% level,  signiﬁcant at the 1%
level.
Men’s education level does not aﬀect the work timing estimate, but the education level of the women does.
Couples with higly educated women create 1:26 hours more WTO, whereas other couples with less educated
women create less WTO. The household income represents the gross yearly income measured in euros.
We distinguish three categories: (0,45000], (45000,68000] and > 68000.9 Couples with a high (medium,
low) household income create more (less) WTO. These result are likely to be driven by the underlying
characteristic-package of households that (partly) explain how traditional households are. In other words,
the eﬀect of being a less (or more) traditional household is captured by the characteristic-package: being
higher educated, working more hours, and having less children. These less traditional households presumably
have more control over their work schedules and maximize the amount of joint leisure.
Couples where men and women are more in control of their own working times create more WTO.
However, this eﬀect is not found for spouses who have full control over their own working times. An
explanation is that these spouses have jobs with autonomous responsibilities and work on average more
hours. These responsibilities and the number of job hours may limit these persons ability to time their work
hours.
9The income variable contains many missing values. To account for these missing values, we replaced the records by zero,
and added a dummy in the regression equation, indicating 1 when the information on household income was missing, and 0
otherwise.
124 Work Timing, Joint Activities and Child Care Demand
Until now, we have examined whether there is work timing and how this work timing diﬀers for diﬀerent
household types. There are diﬀerent reasons why couples may time their working hours. One of them is
that when couples can spend more time with their partner on other activities when they create more WTO.
In this section we, therefore, test whether work timing behavior aﬀects the demand for child care. As in
equation 1, the work timing estimate is represented by the diﬀerence between the WTO of the couples and
that of the control group couples, i.e.
∆ = WTO   WTOc: (2)
4.1 Work timing and the Time Spent on Joint Activities
In this subsection we examine how work timing is related to the time that couples jointly spend on leisure,
household tasks, and child care. We ﬁrst focus on the relation between work timing and joint leisure.
The Eﬀect of Work Timing on Joint Leisure
There is information on the total amount of leisure (tl) that is spent by each spouse per week, and informa-
tion on the joint leisure that spouses spend with their partner per week (tl;joint). For each household, we






where LTO stands for the amount of leisure time overlap. The amount of joint leisure time can never be
more than min(tl;male;tl;female) and so we multiplied the numerator by 2, such that the fraction LTO lies in
the interval [0,1]. More importantly, the multiplication is necessary, because in the denominator, any joint
leisure time is counted twice and therefore joint leisure time should be counted twice in the numerator as
well.
In Table 7, we present the frequency table of leisure time overlap. For one of the households it was not
possible to construct LTO. When we consider the ﬁrst and the second columns, we ﬁnd that 117 households
have 10 to 20 percent LTO. From the third and fourth column we deduce that these 117 households cover
6.4 percent of the households in the sample and 10.77 percent of the households in the sample have between
0 and 20 percent LTO.
The table shows that the distribution of LTO is skewed to the left. About 65 percent of the households
have more than 50 percent LTO, but at the same time households are well spread over the diﬀerent LTO
intervals.
13Table 7: Frequency table of Leisure Time Overlap
% LTO Freq. % Cum. %
0-10 80 4.37 4.37
10-20 117 6.40 10.77
20-30 104 5.69 16.46
30-40 176 9.62 26.08
40-50 169 9.24 35.32
50-60 170 9.29 44.61
60-70 181 9.90 54.51
70-80 186 10.17 64.68
80-90 275 15.04 79.72
90-100 371 20.28 100
Total 1829 100 100
We could use a linear regression model to model the relation between joint leisure and work timing. We
would then regress LTO on ∆ while controlling for several household characteristics. The estimation model
would then look like:
LTO = 0 + 1  x1 + ::: + n  xn + LTO  ∆ + "LTO; (4)
where the estimation parameters are represented by  and LTO; x represent the n control variables; and ∆
represents the work timing estimate. Since the equality in (4) will not hold exactly we add the usual error
term "LTO  N(0;"LTO). However, the model in (4) can predict values for LTO that are greater than 1 or
smaller than 0, since the model does not ‘know’ that the dependent variable has only values on the interval




) = 0 + 1  x1 + ::: + n  xn + LTO  ∆ + "LTO: (5)
The predictions of LTO of the logistic model are in the interval [0,1], although the model parameters can
be any real number. The model is estimated using a maximum likelihood estimation procedure and the
following control variables are used in the estimation model:10
 a dummy indicating if there are no children in the household;
 a dummy indicating if there are more than two children present in the household;
 a dummy indicating if there is a child present in the household aged between 0 and 4;
 a dummy indicating if there is a child present in the household aged between 4 and 12;
 education level dummies for men and women, where we distinguish between a low, medium, and high
education level (high is used as the reference group).
Because the timing behavior of households with children could be diﬀerent from that of households without
children, we interacted ∆ with two dummy variables, namely, if there is a child aged aged 0 to 4, and if there
is a child present aged 4 to 12.11
10We also included the household income, the size of the municipality, and the ﬁrm size, because we expected that these
variables could be explanatory for the variation in LTO. However, it turned out that this was not the case and so we did not
include these variables in the model.
11We have also included interaction eﬀects with the education levels of men and women, but these interaction eﬀects were
not signiﬁcant and were dropped from the model.
14Table 8 presents the estimation results. The amount of LTO is signiﬁcantly lower when there are more
than two children present in the household and when there are children present in the household aged below
12. The signs of the education levels of men are positive but insigniﬁcant. The lower woman’s education
level, the less joint leisure time both spouses have.
We ﬁnd a positive constant work timing eﬀect on LTO. To have an idea of the impact of ∆ on LTO,
we simulated how increasing ∆ by 1 hour aﬀects the fraction LTO, evaluating all other variables in their
sample averages. We ﬁnd that couples increase the amount of joint leisure by 8.4 minutes when they create
1 more hour of WTO.
Table 8: Leisure Time Overlap regression




Dummy more than two children -0.502∗∗∗ -3.31
Dummy child present between 0-4 -0.295∗∗ -2.47
Dummy child present between 4-12 -0.934∗∗∗ -9.10
Male has low education level 0.169 1.26
Male has middle education level 0.067 0.59
Female has low education level -0.334∗∗ -2.22
Female has middle education level -0.141 -1.27
Constant 1.210∗∗∗ 11.38
∆ Dummy child present 0-4 -0.041∗∗∗ -3.33







Note:  signiﬁcant at the 10% level,  signiﬁcant at the 5% level,  signiﬁcant at the 1%
level. yLtotal is the sample average of the aggregated leisure hours of men and women.
The amount of LTO is negatively related to ∆ interacted with the child dummy that indicates that there
is a child in the household aged 0 to 4. Parents with children aged between 0 and 4 tend to create less LTO,
because the estimated coeﬃcient oﬀsets the constant work timing eﬀect. Simulating how an increase of ∆
by 1 hour aﬀects LTO, and considering the interaction eﬀects, we ﬁnd that parents with children aged 0 to
4 decrease the amount of joint leisure by 3.4 minutes. For other couples we ﬁnd that an increase of ∆ by 1
hour results in 21 minutes more LTO. This ﬁnding in line with the empirical ﬁndings of Hallberg (2003),
Jenkins and Osberg (2005), and Van Klaveren and Maassen van den Brink (2007).
The Eﬀect of Work Timing on Joint Housework
A similar analysis can be performed for the time that couples jointly spend on household chores. Household
chores include activities such as cooking, repairing the car, cleaning, and doing the laundry, but it does not
include child care related activities. The amount of joint housework as a fraction of the total time that both





where HTO stands for housework time overlap; th;joint is the joint time spent on housework; and th;i is the
amount of individual time spent on housework by i = male;female. In Table 9 we present the frequency table
of HTO and the interpretation of this table is similar to that of Table 7. We ﬁnd that the fractions of joint
household time are clustered around the lower intervals. Apparently, household chores are mostly performed
alone, since 70 percent of the households spend less than 40 percent of the total housework time jointly. This
may be explained by a gender ideology, in the sense that household chores are predominantly male-activities,
such as repairing chores, or female-activities, such as doing the laundry (West and Zimmerman (1987), Ferree
(1990), South and Spitze (1994), Becker (1994), Greenstein (1996) ). It may also be explained by a relative
resources theory, in the sense that the spouse who earns the most specializes in paid labor, while the partner
specializes in household chores (Sampson and Lichter (1991), Ferree (1991) and Kamo (1988)).
Table 9: Frequency table of Housework Time Overlap
% HTO Freq. % Cum. %
0-10 415 22.75 22.75
10-20 309 16.94 39.69
20-30 310 17.00 56.69
30-40 193 10.58 67.27
40-50 169 9.27 76.54
50-60 138 7.57 84.10
60-70 119 6.52 90.63
70-80 39 2.14 92.76
80-90 57 3.13 95.89
90-100 75 4.11 100.00
Total 1824 100 100





) = 0 + 1  x1 + ::: + n  xn + HTO  ∆ + "HTO; (7)
with "HTO  N(0;"HTO), where  and HTO are the parameters to be estimated, x represent the same n
control variables that we used in (5); and ∆ represents the work timing estimate.
We ﬁnd that the time spent jointly on household chores is lower, as the woman’s education level is lower
and when their are children present aged 4-12. This is in line with the relative resources model that predicts
that women in more traditional households, with lower education levels and children, perform most of the
household chores, which on its turn should reduce the time that spouses jointly spend on household chores
(e.g. Ferree (1991)).
16Table 10: Housework Time Overlap regression




Dummy more than two children -0.190 -0.88
Dummy child present between 0-4 -0.065 -0.38
Dummy child present between 4-12 -0.378∗∗∗ -2.59
Male has low education level -0.706∗∗∗ -3.71
Male has middle education level -0.108 -0.68
Female has low education level -0.570∗∗ -2.67
Female has middle education level -0.282∗ -1.79
Constant -0.788∗∗∗ -5.22
∆ Dummy child present 0-4 -0.019 -1.08





Note:  signiﬁcant at the 10% level,  signiﬁcant at the 5% level,  signiﬁcant at the 1%
level.
We ﬁnd that there is a constant and positive work timing eﬀect, but, at the same time, there is a negative
eﬀect of the work timing variable interacted with the child 4-12 dummy. By simulation, we ﬁnd for couples
with a child aged 4 to 12 that they spend 0.06 minutes less time on joint housework as a result of a one hour
increase in ∆. For the other households we ﬁnd that they spend 3.77 minutes more time on joint housework
as a result of a one hour increase in ∆. This work timing eﬀect is in line with the specialization behavior as
predicted by the relative resources theory (e.g. Becker (1994)).
The Eﬀect of Work Timing on Child Care
Finally, we examine whether work timing and joint child care are related. We again use the following measure





where CTO stands for child care time overlap and tc;joint, tc;male and tc;female stand for respectively, the
time that spouses jointly spend on child care and the time that each partner spends on child care in total.
The frequency table of CTO is presented in Table 11.
17Table 11: Frequency table of Child care Time Overlap
% CTO Freq. % Cum. %
0-10 206 20.44 20.44
10-20 82 8.13 28.57
20-30 105 10.42 38.99
30-40 99 9.82 48.81
40-50 103 10.22 59.03
50-60 108 10.71 69.74
60-70 111 11.01 80.75
70-80 38 3.77 84.52
80-90 67 6.65 91.17
90-100 89 8.83 100.00
Total 1008 100 100
The number of observations necessarily drops because not all couples in our sample have children. We do
not observe a systematic pattern in the distribution of CTO. Most households answer that the amount of
CTO is between 0 and 10 percent of the total amount of child care time. With the exception of the intervals
70-80 and 80-90, it seems that each of the other intervals contain about 10 percent of the households in the
sample.




) = 0 + 1  x1 + ::: + n  xn + CTO  ∆ + "CTO (9)
with "CTO  N(0;"CTO), where  and CTO are the estimation parameters, x represent the same n control
variables that we used before, and ∆ represents the work timing estimate. Because parents appear in the
estimation sample only when they have children, the reference group is now parents who have only children
older than 12 years old.
The estimation results in Table 12 show that parents with children younger than twelve years old tend
to spend more time on joint on child care. This may reﬂect a preference of parents to care for the children
together, especially when they are young. Alternatively, it may be that children who are older than 12 have
a preference for less time with their parents. Moreover, the CTO measure could be noisier for older children,
because they simply need less care.
With respect to the timing of work schedules, we expected that parents with young children would create
less WTO, either because of the preference for parental child care or because they want to reduce the cost
of child care. The estimation results, however, show that the work timing variable interacted with the
child dummies are not signiﬁcant. The hypothesis that less WTO would lead to less CTO is therefore not
supported by the data.
18Table 12: Child care Time Overlap regression




Dummy more than two children -0.462 -1.63
Dummy child present between 0-4 0.730∗∗∗ 2.96
Dummy child present between 4-12 1.060∗∗∗ 4.58
Male has low education level -1.137∗∗∗ -3.49
Male has middle education level -0.471∗ -1.70
Female has low education level -0.090 -0.24
Female has middle education level -0.117 -0.42
Constant -1.001∗∗∗ -3.14
∆ Dummy child present 0-4 -0.026 -1.05





Note:  signiﬁcant at the 10% level,  signiﬁcant at the 5% level,  signiﬁcance at the 1%
level.
4.2 Work Timing and Child Care Demand
In this section focuses on the relation between work timing and the actual demand for child care. We ﬁrst
shortly explain how child care is arranged in the Netherlands. The government child care policy in the
Netherlands drastically changed after January 2005. Before January 2005, formal child care institutions
were ﬁnanced by the local authorities so child care institutions could oﬀer child care to parents for a lower
price. However, this placed them in a dominant position, for several reasons. First of all, parents were
not aware about the real costs of the child care they demanded, also because the amount of the subsidy
varied somewhat arbitrarily over diﬀerent localities which made child care prices non-transparent. Second,
child care demand exceeded child care supply, and as a consequence parents could not freely choose between
diﬀerent child care alternatives.
After January 2005 several changes were implemented to improve the way child care was arranged.
Subsidies were given to parents instead of to child care institutions. Parents ﬁrst paid the cost of child care
themselves and then received a reimbursement from the government and the employer. When both spouses
worked, employers together had to reimburse one-third of the child care costs to parents. The reimbursement
of the government was income-dependent and decreases as with the household income. In the year 2005,
the reimbursement for the ﬁrst child was 63.2 percent when the yearly household income was 16000 euros
and less than 1.8 percent when the yearly household income was 71.883 euros (see Kok, Groot, Mulder
and Sadiraj (2006)). The new policy gave parents an incentive to demand child care at a reasonable price,
because they had to pay an own share.
The number of child care institutions increased enormously (maybe due to the change in child care
policy), such that child care demand was no longer higher than child care supply. A direct result was that
parents could choose freely between the diﬀerent child care alternatives, and could choose the child care
institution that oﬀered a good price/quality ratio. Given this new situation, child care institutions had an
19incentive to oﬀer eﬃcient child care as they competed with other institutions, which lead to lower prices and
better quality child care.12
For our study, parents were asked how many formal and informal child care hours they actually demanded.
As we mention above, parents ﬁrst pay the child care costs themselves and then receive a reimbursement.
Therefore, we expect that parents have a fairly good idea of the amount they paid for the amount of child
care they demanded.
In Table 13 we show the descriptive statistics of the monthly child care demand and the prices they paid
for this child care. Parents use informal child care relatively more frequently than formal child care. The
hourly price of formal child care (7.92) is, as expected, much higher than that of informal child care (1.47).
Informal child care is often supplied by grandparents, and parents usually do not pay them for their caring
service. In 72 cases parents use both formal and informal child care and these parents demand on average
29.1 informal child care hours, which is about equal to the average informal child care in Table 13. Parents
demand more hours formal child care than informal child care.
Table 13: Child care demand and prices
Percentiles
Freq. Mean 5 % 95 %
Quantity
Formal child care demand 150 67.13 8 160
Informal child care demand 404 29.99 3 85
Prices
Hourly price formal child care 150 7.92 2.39 18.04
Hourly price informal child care 404 1.47 0 7.69
In order to examine whether work timing aﬀects child care, we estimate the following two equations
seperately:
logFC = 0 + 1  z1 + ::: + j  zj + FC  ∆ + "FC
logIC = 0 + 1  z1 + ::: + j  zj + IC  ∆ + "IC
(10)
where FC and IC stand for, respectively, the hours of formal child care and the hours of informal child care.
The model parameters are represented by , , IC and FC. ∆ represents the work timing estimate; and we
also have the usual two error terms "FC  N(0;"FC) and "IC  N(0;"IC). In the regression we control
for various household characteristics that are represented by the variables z. These characteristics are:
 Hourly price of child care;
 # of children aged between 0 and 4;
 # of children aged between 4 and 12;
 Education level dummies for men and women;
 Household income and a dummy variable that controls for the missing values;
 Dummy that indicates 1 if the household uses informal and formal child care.
Both equations are estimated separately, and we control for the fact that some households use both formal
and informal child care by including a dummy variable in both regressions, indicating 1 if households make
12An elaborate study (in Dutch) is given in Kok et al. (2006).
20use of both formal and informal child care, and 0 otherwise.13 Since the reimbursement of the government is
income-dependent, and because households with a higher income can aﬀord child care more easily, we include
the logarithm of the household income. Income is measured in categories, and the income variable that we
construct is the logarithm of the gross household income that represents the mid-income of the interval that
is appropriate for the household.
Because we expect that the work timing behavior of parents is related to the presence of young children,
we interacted ∆ with a child dummy indicating whether there is a child present aged 0-4. The estimation
results are printed in Table 14.
13Including an indicator that indicates whether parents use both types of child care might be problematic, because this
variable is partly determined by the outcome variable. Therefore we examine how the eﬀect of work timing on child care
demand changes when we re-estimate the model while excluding this variable. We ﬁnd that exclusion of this variable does not
aﬀect the estimated eﬀect of work timing on child care demand.
21Table 14: The Eﬀect of Work Timing on Child Care Demand
Variable Estimate t-statistic
Formal Child Care
Price per hour formal child care -0.360∗∗∗ -2.98
# Children between 0-4 1.009∗∗∗ 4.82
# Children between 4-12 0.048 0.28
Male has low education level 0.138 0.78
Male has medium education level 0.034 0.25
Female has low education level -0.839∗∗ -2.48
Female has medium education level -0.166 -1.29
Log(household income) -0.166 -0.6
Control for 22 missing values of the household income -0.453 -0.58
Dummy: both formal and informal care -0.387∗∗∗ -3.32
Constant 4.763∗∗∗ 5.54
∆ Dummy child present 0-4 0.018 1.26
∆ 0.008 0.71
Informal Child Care
Price per hour informal child care -0.064 -1.02
# Children between 0-4 0.714∗∗∗ 4.05
# Children between 4-12 -0.187 -1.28
Male has low education level -0.229 -1.53
Male has medium education level -0.183 -1.49
Female has low education level 0.171 0.92
Female has medium education level 0.180 1.53
Log(household income) 0.281 0.88
Control for 73 missing values of the household income 1.042 1.19
Dummy: both formal and informal care -0.257∗ -1.88
Constant 2.058∗∗ 2.28





Note:  signiﬁcant at the 10% level,  signiﬁcant at the 5% level,  signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
When the price of formal child care is higher, parents demand less child care, and so parents will demand
more informal child care, or will provide the child care themselves. With respect to the latter situation,
the theoretical literature on labor supply and child care demand unanimously predicts that the woman will
be responsible for providing the child care in that case. Either because she usually has the least resources
(Ferree (1991), Becker (1994)), or because child care is a female activity (Greenstein (1996)), or because the
(on average) lower income and education level give here a weaker bargaining position (Lundberg and Pollak
22(1993)). We do not ﬁnd such a price eﬀect for the demand of informal child care, although the sign points in
the right direction. This is likely caused by the fact that most of the prices of informal child care are either
zero or very low, so it is the lack of variation of this variable that causes the insigniﬁcance.
Parents demand more child care when there are more young children in the household. This result is
found for the demand for both formal and informal child care. When parents demand formal child care,
this inﬂuences the demand for informal child care negatively, and vice versa. We do not ﬁnd an eﬀect for
children aged between 4 and 12. This may be caused by the fact that, in the Netherlands, children go to
school when they are 4/5 years old. Therefore, we would expect a reduction in the demand for child care at
the point when the children go to school.
We do not ﬁnd any income eﬀect, which is surprising. We would expect that the demand for child care is
higher when the household income is higher. First of all, households with more income can aﬀord child care
more easily. Second, when households earn more money they will, on average, also work more labor hours,
which makes the need for child care higher. It may be that the small number of observations, together with
the fact that income is measured on an interval level and has many missing values, results in an insigniﬁcant
eﬀect of income on child care demand.
Households where women are lower educated demand less formal child care. For these women the
diﬀerences between the hourly child care price and the hourly wages is relatively small, so that they are
more likely to decide to take care of the children themselves.
We are particularly interested in whether work timing is related to child care demand. We ﬁnd that work
timing aﬀects the demand for informal child care positively, but does not aﬀect the demand for formal child
care. There is a constant work timing eﬀect on the demand for informal child care, but also the interaction
eﬀect with having a young child is signiﬁcant. Both estimates are positive indicating that when parent create
more overlap in their work schedules demand more child care.
On the basis of the estimates, we can simulate how the demand for informal child care changes when
parents create 1 more hour of WTO. In order to do so, we ﬁrst predict the amount of informal child care
based on the parameter estimates, where we evaluate all explanatory variables in their sample mean, i.e.
c IC∆ = eˆ 0+ˆ 1·¯ z1+:::+ˆ j·¯ zj+ˆ IC·∆ (11)
Then we replace ∆ by ∆+1 and predict again the amount of informal child care as in 11:
c IC∆+1 = eˆ 0+ˆ 1·¯ z1+:::+ˆ j·¯ zj+ˆ IC·˜ ∆ (12)
with
23˜ ∆ = ∆ + 1
The diﬀerence between c IC∆+1 and c IC∆ then represents the change in informal child care when parents
create 1 more hour of WTO. We note that we have corrected in the calculation for the fact that we measure
work timing per week and the demand for informal child care per month. In Table 15 we show the descriptive
statistics of c IC∆+1 - c IC∆.
In the ﬁrst row of Table 15, we show the eﬀect of work timing on the demand for child care without
considering the interaction eﬀect. We ﬁnd that parents demand 7.62 minutes more informal child care if they
create 1 more hour of WTO per month. This is what we would expect, since the creation of more WTO
results in less time that one of the two partners can be at home taking care of the child.
We hypothesized that parents with young children create less WTO to avoid the cost of child care, and
so we included and interaction eﬀect. Cost avoiding behavior is not relevant in the case of informal child
care, due to the low hourly prices. We ﬁnd that parents who create more WTO demand more informal child
care, and this eﬀect is more pronounced when there are young children in the household (12 minutes). The
latter likely reﬂects that the preference for informal child care is even stronger when children are young.
We expected that the presence of young children would aﬀect the demand for formal child care through
the parents’ work timing behavior so that we would observe that parents create less WTO and/or use more
informal child care. The empirical results do show that parents demand less formal child care when they make
use of informal child care, but a work timing eﬀect is not observed. Earlier, we hypothesized that parents
minimize the cost of paid child care by their work timing behavior, but this hypothesis is not supported by
the data.
Table 15: The eﬀect of work timing on the demand for informal child care
Percentiles
c IC∆+1 - c IC∆ Freq. Mean 5 % 95 %
All households with children 404 7.62 2.1 16.5
Households with child 0-4 216 12.00 3.36 19.32
Households with child 4 188 2.58 1.32 6.18
245 Conclusion
In this study we examined the work timing behavior of spouses. With timing behavior we mean the behavior
that results in the performance of paid labor at the same time that cannot be explained by factors other
than the partners’ potential to communicate on the timing of their work.
We ﬁnd evidence for work timing behavior. Parents create less work time overlap and the eﬀect is more
pronounced the younger the children. Childless couples create, on average, 5 hours more WTO than parents
with children aged between 0 and 4. These results are consistent with the idea that parents time their work
hours to minimize the costs of formal child care.
Household that create relatively more work time overlap are households with higher educated women,
with a higher household income, with less children, and with spouses who have more control over their work
times. This is in line with the idea that the spouses of these households have strong preferences for spending
time on joint activities (see, for example, Hamermesh (1996, 2000), Hallberg (2003), Jenkins and Osberg
(2005), Van Klaveren and Maassen van den Brink (2007) and Carriero et al. (2009).
Therefore, we examine how work timing behavior is related with the time that couples spend jointly
on the activities leisure, housework and child care. We ﬁnd a togetherness preference, as is also found in
Hallberg (2003) and Van Klaveren and Maassen van den Brink (2007), but only for childless couples. When
spouses create 1 hour more work time overlap this results in 21 minutes more joint leisure for childless couples
and in 3.4 minutes less joint leisure for couples with a young child. The timing of working hours is also
related to the time spouses spend jointly on household chores. Parents with a child aged 4-12 who create 1
hour more work time overlap spend 0.06 minutes less time jointly on housework. For other households the
creation of 1 hour more work time overlap results in 3.77 minutes more time on joint housework. The timing
of work hours is not related with joint child care time.
Finally, we examined how work timing behavior is related with the demand for child care. We ﬁnd that
work timing aﬀects informal child care demand, but not formal child care demand. On average, parents
demand 7.62 minutes per month more informal child care if one more hour of work time overlap is created
per month. Parents with young children demand 12 minutes more informal child care when one more hour
of work time overlap is created.
We hypothesized that parents with young children create less work time overlap to avoid the cost of
child care. We ﬁnd, however, that parents who create more overlap in their work schedules demand more
informal child care, but not formal child care. This may be explained by the fact that the government
subsidizes informal child care, such as that provided by the grandparents, in order to stimulate the labor
force participation (of women). The total expenditures of this subsidy were larger than was originally
estimated, and one of the reasons was that the amount of child care provided by the informal sector was
larger than was anticipated. In a policy revision in 2007 the subsidy was lowered but it is still 2.50 euros
25per hour per child.14.
It is interesting to continue this line of research in several ways. An important extension would be to
estimate a model where work timing and the labor supply decisions of both partners are studied simultane-
ously. Labor supply and work timing are then both considered as endogenous variables and this enables us
to measure the eﬀect of work timing on the individual labor supplies. The outcomes of such a study are of
importance for policy makers.
Currently, government policies focus on increasing the labor supply of women, but the possible eﬀects of
work timing on labor supply are ignored. It may be that a policy more focused on work timing would be more
eﬀective and possibly even cheaper than a policy that results in subsidizing child care only. Alternatively,
it may be that parents time their work hours to avoid work time overlap because of lack of child care, and
this can cause a lot of stress. The observed work timing behavior may therefore actually be evidence of lack
of suﬃcient child care.
14See http://www.mik-online.nl/page.asp?id=658 (in Dutch).
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